

On the nature of the Hard Problem of Consciousness, and why neural correlates are of no help.

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(ver 1.1)

This essay is about the Hard Problem of Consciousness, and why the notion of neural correlates is of no help in considering it. The questions that I will attempt to answer herein are:

> What makes the hard problem hard?,
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> What is the nature of the hard problem?,
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> Why is this worth thinking in this way about the nature of consciousness?,
>
> What sort of things come up with these considerations?.

When thinking about consciousness, and the 'hard problem' it is important to ask, is what is the fundamental nature of the problem? When we look at the 'question and answer process', as a special case of the more kind of notion of "an epistemic process", we are considering the manner by which we come to know something.

Epistemic process, in the general theory of metaphysics, asks things like:

How do we know anything?, and,

by which methods can we actually answer questions?.

From this, we can ask:

what do or can we know
about the nature of consciousness?,
and,

by what methods do/can we come to know it?.

It might be suggested that what can we know about the nature of consciousness, and of the epistemic tools that we would normally use, is from some version of the a scientific method, and things like that -- all of which depend upon the notion of observation, of experiment. Thinking about it this way, it quickly becomes apparent that we just simply cannot observe the subjective. We don't see consciousness. There is no real way to detect consciousness, the subjective, using any sort of physical or mechanical tools and instrumentation.

Nonetheless, we agree that we are still, somehow, undeniably having this experience of being conscious -- whatever that means -- and moreover, that we have some sense that there is at least from of 'a 1st person perspective'. No matter how generally successful the more usual scientific epistemic methods have been in so many other areas, conscousness remains stubbornly unavailable to all of them. Despite the reality of this unavilability, and also of the wholesale success of science everywhere elsewhere, there is still some sort of real phenomenon that is worth describing, that is as yet, not very well described.

When we look at the questions of: what is the kind of knowledge(?) -- what is the kind of information(?) -- that are we are able to gain from observational methodologies(?), we notice that there is a significant difference between the observational results that we can (or at least in theory could) obtain from scientific methods,

measurements, and things like that, all of which are objective, on one hand, and the kind of observational results we obtain from a 1st person subjective perspective, on the other. From this difference, we can begin to consider what might be the nature of the epistemic tools needed to address the question of: what is the nature of the hard problem?

One way to characterize such a question is to ask: how do we account for a 1st person experience purely in terms of 3rd person information and understanding?.

When we look at what science does -- implemented interactive experiments and the collection of measurements, and followup by noticing correlations in those measurements which are formable into causal theories. Those theories -- what we constitute as 'scientific knowledge' -- describe the regular and recurring causal relationships that we observe about ("in") our physical universe. This provides a 'field of knowledge' -- what we know from the scientific method. That field of knowledge is, in all cases, defined and described in terms of constant consistent patterns of causation.

In this, overall and fundamentally, what we are dealing with is a kind of symmetry concept. We notice that the same causal laws apply everywhere in the physical universe -- that in everything that we observe, that there is some underlying pattern of consistent cause and effect relationships -- between antecedent(s) and consequent(s), usually all as considered in terms of, described as a consequence of, a single unifying mathematical description.

What we have then is this knowledge of recurring patterns. The idea is that there are the same patterns in different spaces, in different times, and that would even be the same, assuming consistency in what we can posit as different sequences of possibilities -- that the same causal antecedents would be followed by the same causal consequences. This is fundamentally a notion of symmetry.

Moreover, when considering the notion that there is only always just a finite amount of information collected in any measurement process, or when recognizing that the "stuff" of the universe

consists of atomic matter, or particles, or things like that -- all of which have a discreet nature -- the notion of 'quantization' itself, are all notions indicative of an inherent and essential discontinuity.

Yet we experience our consciousness as a whole, as a totality, as a unitary phenomena. These are all notions of continuity. Hence, the question becomes: how is there created -- how do we account for -- the fact of a/ our sense of consciousness, which is experienced in a unitary way, experienced subjectively in the 1st person, when the totality of the objective universe is described in the 3rd person, in terms of essential discontinuity?.

Moreover, we experience consciousness -- our own personal subjective -- in a very specific and asymmetric way. The specificity of self, here and now, is an inherent breaking of symmetry. We experience subjectivity/ consciousness in the sense of being 'at a time', 'in a place', and observing definite states of the world (specific possibilities). We never experience superpositions of states. When we consider the 'Schrodinger cat experiment', and actually look at the cat, for example, we never actually observe it -- the cat -- to be in the superposition of the states. It is 'as if' we could simultaneously observe multiple possibilities -- yet we never actually do. The bemused cat is never, in our observation, both alive and dead at the same time. This basic fact of this reality, of everyone's consistent experience, is the very reason that the notion of such an experiment involving 'possible cats' was conceived in the 1st place. It was intended to make obvious a special kind of absurdity.

As such, we have this phenomenology that describes consciousness in a unitary way. And yet all consciousness always has locality, in time, in space, and in possibility. It has inherent specificy -- a kind of inherent asymmetry between here and here, between now and then, and what happened and what did not happen -- a kind of selection of one as actual and the other as only and merely being potential.

Therefore, in that specific sense, we are actually looking at two contrasting perspectives -- what the 3rd person perspective has as its fundamental descriptive basis -- characterization of the real in terms of the notions of symmetry and discontinuity, and 1st

person perspective, which has as its fundamental descriptive basis notions in terms of asymmetry and continuity.

Atomic matter, individual bits, finite characterization -- and even the notion of the separation between subject and object -- are all notions of discreteness, of discontinuity. This along with the notion of a consistent lawfulness which operates in all the universe, regardless of position in time, space, or possibility, is an inherent notion of symmetry. In science, these provide the root characterizations of what is known and knowable. They are inherent from the epistemic process of the scientific method itself, the sort of field of information, and the body of knowledge, that comes from that basis.

When consider the neccessary fundamental descriptions of all things associated with consciousness, the subjective, and the 1st person perspective, especially when done from a 1st person perspective, we notice this fundamental asymmetry and selectivity of position, time, and possibility. Even physical measurements -- all real experiments -- as the primary epistemic basis of science itself, regardless of how we represent that knowledge later, happen at specific times and places, as measurements obtaining finite knowledge. There is a difference between here and there and this an asymmetry of time. There is a difference between now and then, previous to now as past, and after now as future, both of which are, in some real sense, completely inaccessible -- untouchable from the absolute here and now, as a single point in time, space, and possibility. Moreover, there is fundamentally a locality in possibility, as in we see the possibility we're in, rather than the counterfactual states of what could have been.

As such, even in science, at least to start with, there is an essential a locality in time -- concepts quickly factored out so as to achieve generalization and utility of the universal application of lawful concepts.

Therefore, whereas the nature of the hard problem could be, as was described previously, as a question in the form of: "how do we account for a 1st person perspective in terms of 3rd person perspective?", we now can translate this question into the form of: "how do we account for continuity in terms of things which have a

discontinuous nature?", and "how do we account for the inescapable apparent fact of asymmetry, of 'access controls' on the field of information we can know, given the field of information that we're starting with has an inherent symmetry?".

From this basis, we could assert that what makes 'the hard problem' hard, is that it is inherently conceptually problematic to try to construct a notion of unity out of inherent discontinuity, and moreover, at the same time, to construct notion of asymmetry out of notions of symmetry. Yet even this does not really get at the essential nature of the issue, for these two new questions represent the problem as a conceptual one, yet the actual fact of the matter is that these are not concepts we are considering -- it is experience -- the nature of our experience of experience -- in terms of its epistemic basis, that we are considering, as an actual problem.

More is needed than just looking at (for) some novel notion or conception of the asymmetry and time, space, and possibility -- each a kind of localization, as a kind of asymmetry, in terms of a 3rd person perspective and body of knowledge that does not really have any need for a specificity in terms of time or space, or of a particular possibility. Such conceptions do not hold any promise of being able to provide any verifiable epistemic process or foundation for the simple questions of:

- 1; Why is there a an experience of a singular moment,
(this moment, rather than that one)?,

- 2; Why does time flow in direction that it does,
(rather than some other way; the arrow not "backwards")?.

- 3; Why does time "flow" at the rate that it does
(rather than some other rate)?.

Out of all selected moments, what selects the specific moment? What selects the specific direction, that distinguishes past from future, so that these concepts are not regularly inter-changeable, symmetric, that our access to all existing states was somehow 'even' and 'consistent'? Why is it the case that we could not just flip, to have the past and the future swapped with one another, so that the arrow of time was pointing the other way?. Why is it the case that I can not epistemicaly know the lottery numbers from

remembering what is going to happen tomorrow, and therefore win today? And why would we maybe have time flow faster or slower than it does rather than at the rate that it does? What does it makes it that this rate of the flow of time is special? We could characterize the notion of the hard problem as being roughly isomorphic to any of these questions.

And these questions just don't even make sense in the field of knowledge of that is physics. With the field of the knowledge of physics, both general relativity and quantum mechanics -- both of these theories -- factor time out.

Yet when we look at things from a 1st person perspective, with a kind of inherent observer and observation nature, rather than of an observable nature, the intrinsic of time is in the very nature of the experience -- inseparably. This is a solid, knowable characterization of the fundamental nature of the hard problem. From this characterization, that the real nature of time itself is involved, we can make some clear and general epistemic observations pretty quickly.

For example, a lot of people claim that they are making inroads to "addressing the hard problem of consciousness" in the area of neurological studies -- brain science. If we have a clear correspondences between pushing on certain neurons in the brain, and experiences subjectively reported by a person on the operating table, we can establish neural correlates between physical phenomenon, in a discreet causal sense, and a real subjective experience, in a 1st person sense. This is clearly a correspondence between something which is described in the 3rd person way and something which is describing a 1st person way. And that would seem to be exactly what is wanted -- some connection between 3rd person (push here in anyone's brain) and 1st person (that person will experience something like X) -- as if it was descriptive of the nature of experience.

And yet what is interesting about this is to recognize that even presupposing that we were to have a really, really good knowledge of these neural correlates, it would not help. Imagine that that already had some sort of perfected knowledge -- an entire library of books detailing statements in the form "this area of the brain is

associated with that type of experience". This is not so hard to imagine -- there is no conceptual barrier to assuming that we would and could eventually be able to have a considerable sophistication and understanding of detailed relationships between neural structures in the brain and 1st-person subjective experiences.

However, none of this does actually help us with respect to solving the hard problem. A knowledge of existing neural correlates simply does not give any new tools or technology, any new epistemic methods of thinking. Facts of that kind does not provide us a valid, or even possible, epistemic basis, or epistemic methodology, or any such, for moving from the the unknown to the known, particularly in the case of why at this moment, rather than that other one, why does time flow in the direction that it does, or why does it flow at the rate that it does? Why is there localization in the specific sense -- a here, now, and this, as a kind of specific, out of all of the undifferentiated possible, and how do we construct the unity of consciousness, the 1st person experience -- all of that is still not accounted for. That this is true, even if we were to have really good information about neural correlates.

The fact that I happen to be pushing on a particular brain tissue rather than just pushing on the end of someones finger, means that the information, the neurological claims, is all of the same kind. Where the 'sense information' happens to be entering the body -- where the "conversion" between physical objective world and inner subjective world 'actually happens' -- where that "transition" happens, is not at all defined, not matter how we might move the 'sense data entry point' around in the body. That entry point -- physical events relative to subjective events -- can be moved around arbitrarily, however is wanted, and there is still **not** obtained any basis at all for explaining any of the important questions outlined earlier. Has the knowledge of neural correlates actually given us any new information about resolving 1; the localization problem (in time, space, possibility), or 2; the asymmetry from symmetry problem, or 3; what establishes the scale of time rate of change problem, let alone 4; any unification of coherency out of a field of elements of dis-unity and discreteness. People who claim that neural correlates are 'explaining consciousness' seeming simply do not understand the true nature

of the problems/ questions unknowingly and inherently being asked.

Even the fact of correlation, which is a-temporal, or even of the generalization of records of lawful causation; neither provide a way of localizing to the specific -- of symmetry breaking in itself -- the establishment of localizing of that causation in some sort of primary or fundamental sense.

The particular fact of neural correlates, no matter how many, or how conceptaully complete they are, however fully we might establish such correlations -- it just does not actually address the fundamental nature of the relevant issues, as outlined, of how do we get asymmetry from symmetry or how do we get a unity, a coherency, of 1st person experience, of consciousness, of mind, etc. These are all notions of the totality of sense, of the notion 'that I am a singular self', the 1st person felt sense that we are even having a notion of feeling anything at all -- feeling is not experienced in a discrete way.

Feeling is always experienced in total unitary way. We do not have 'discrete components of feeling' any more than we have 'discrete components of smell'. Show me a periodic table of feelings, or of scent, or of sensations, and we will at least have some semblance of discreteness, rather than an absolute tyranny of perceptual unity. In that particular sense, from that epistemic reification basis, neural correlates simply do not actually help us -- they are inherently irrelevant to the nature of the problem.

To really make further headway on the nature of the hard problem we actually have to do to try to get from a 3rd person perspective to 1st person perspective and understand why that's actually hard. Why fundamentally, it is not possible to do in terms of correlation, is because even if we were to think about a correlation as inherently a-temporal, we are still not able to say anything about why that specific selected causative relationship between a physical event and a subjective event happened just then. We already knew that there was going to be a causal relationships between physical events and subjective events, in the general case, just by the mere fact that we can sense anything at all. What we do not know is why it is inherent in all experience that time is localized, and that if

there was this generalization of a correlation to physical nature, that we could not simply access tomorrow just as easily as it is to access today.

To really get down to the fundamental epistemic terminology, practice, etc, the difference that will make a difference, we need to consider the relationships of the notions of symmetry and asymmetry and discontinuity and continuity, in themselves -- that is what is fundamental to the question. We are instead needing to be looking at the question of: what is the nature of the epistemic methodology needed to consider the relations between these four terms?

It turns out that to analyze these relationships, between symmetry, asymmetry, continuity, and discontinuity, what we need is a clear and reified notion of comparison. Any measurement is going to be a comparison. Any fact of perception is going to be a type of comparison. In the sense that any interaction at all, as a kind of signal, as a bearer of information, is a kind of comparison -- between what could have been and what actually was. Something is always either less than, or more than something else.

So we can ask, what are the concepts that are intrinsic to the nature of comparison? If I really want to understand, fundamentally, what the nature of interaction is, or of what perception is, all of these things essentially resolve in terms of, or are isomorphic to, the underlying nature of the concept of comparison.

When considering the notion, the concept of comparison itself, in terms of asking, what is intrinsic to the consideration of comparison, it becomes clear that there are six other concepts that are necessary and sufficient. These six are fundamental and essential to a, any, the, or all characterization(s) of the concept of comparison. The concepts are sameness and difference, content and context, subject and object.

Understanding this, it becomes apparent that it is fully impossible to have any fully reified notion, any real concept, of the notion of comparison, without at least somehow implicitly considering exactly these six intrinsics. As such, therefore, it is better that we explicitly notice and mention them.

Understood in this way, we can recognize the notion of the comparison as being an effective reification of the relationship between the subject of the object, in terms of content and context, sameness and difference. From this basis, a new kind of epistemic tool, we can start to make some observations.

In the same way that it can be noticed that there's a relationship between the subject and the object, that where there is one, there is always the other, we can also notice that a similar relationship always holds between content and context, and sameness and difference.

In one sense, the implication might seem to be some form of epiphenomenalism, or in other contexts, has been called the theory of Realism -- the perspective of mind out of matter, that you don't have a mind without a body -- as if saying "you can't have a subjective without there being some object", which is true.

However, if we are going to hold the notion of symmetry as being fundamental, as from the rules of science, from which we are given to understand be in full alignment with the notion of realism, then this required association between subjective and objective must also go the other way. Either symmetry always applies or it does not -- and on what basis are you going to apply it selectively, as per on whim, so being that the given question is about symmetry or asymmetry itself, other people can validly take the 'idealistic perspective', and assert -- as in direct contrast to the realist perspective -- to say "no; the notion of subjective is not an attribute of some arrangement of matter; It's a characteristic of being". As that for every subjective, there is also always inherently an objective, and that, by symmetry, and moreover, by the epistemic primacy of the 1st person perspective, in the form of epistemic process of the scientific method itself as being based on real experimentation with nature, that it therefore makes more sense to treat 1st person as being primary to 3rd person, and hence that subjective actually, perhaps a-temporally, precedes objective.

As an aside, it may be worth noting that there is a difference between asserting that something has being, is real, and asserting that it exists, or even that it is objective. These are each distinct technical claims, and to assert one, in theory or in fact, is to make a

different semantic observation than for either of the others. To say that something is something has realness is to make a definite and different claim than to say that something is objective or to say that something exists. But this is a technicality -- for more information, see http://mflb.com

We might, for various reasons, want to overlook the implied asymmetry of usage, and to stop short of saying that there is a some sort of notion of consciousness, as a primary characteristic, or at least as a characteristic that is equal in primacy as that of objectivity. To do this would be as if to assert some kind of imputed notion of pan-psychism, ie; that everything is conscious, and of course, some philosophiers, particularly physical ones, have some issues with that.

Nonetheless, regardless of how much we extend it, we do notice that there is always some correlation, that there is some relationship, between subject and object, that perception implies both perceiver and perceived. Observation implies both observer (subjective) and observed (objective). That the subject and the object is some relationship, as an expression of the 1st person perspective and a 3rd person perspective, and that we know that we need to use of the notion of comparison, as a basis, would be needed in order to resolve that relationship. Does the concept of comparison apply to the notion of the observer, or to the observed (as a fact of the matter, data, signal, etc), or to the process of observation -- the notion of process, particularly epistemic process -- knowing rather than knowledge.

If we are going to have any kind of epistemic process whatsoever, then we are going to have something, some concept, that is reified in terms of the nature of the concept of comparison itself. Therefore, if we are trying to observe something about the nature of the relationship between subject and object we are wanting to use comparison as a kind of epistemic methodology to understand the nature of comparison. This is why the resolution and reification of that concept in terms of the six intrinsics (of comparison, as subjective, objective, sameness, difference, content, and context) is so important -- it is the basis by which we can proceed. We know that we have these two concepts of subjective and objective, and that they are in balance, in a kind of mutually

implies equation, with the notions of a sameness and a difference, a content and a context. If we can fully reify anything about the absolute nature of the relationships between content and context and sameness and difference, than we can understand something also true about the nature of the relationship between subjective and objective. This makes sense, given that the nature of **any** epistemic processes is going to be defined, and done (implemented) in terms of, practices of -- practices involving -- comparison.

Insofar as measurement is itself a comparison we are just using a different epistemic basis, than that of the method of science, or the method of logic (as mathematics), or even of using computers to figure things out -- to make the unknown knowable, or alternately, to establish the unknown as unknowable (proofs of impossibility). In either case, the underlying epistemic basis is still reified in terms of the same language -- sameness, difference, content, and context, or at a larger scale, in terms of symmetry, continuity, asymmetry, and discontinuity.

In the same way that there's always a content where there is context and sameness where there is difference, and subjective where there is objective, we can impute as a kind of a requirement that for every instance of one of those concepts that the other must occur also. For every one concept of those three pairs, that the other of those concepts in that pair must also occur. It would be unreasonable to try to think of things in terms of having an imbalance in the relationship between content and context. I cannot have context by itself with no concept of content. Nor can I have a concept of content by itself with no concept of context. I can pretend that I am ignoring the concept, but the fact of my enforced ignorance does not make it so. The notion of each one implicitly implies the presence the other, regardless, whether as an explicitly acknowledged and required assumption or not. Similarly I can have no concept of sameness without a concept of difference and no concept of difference without a concept of sameness.

From this basis, we can ask: what are some things that we can notice about the conjunctions of these terms? What is the relation between sameness and difference, content and context, and the notions of things like symmetry, asymmetry, continuity, and

discontinuity? It turns out that the former set can be used as a definitional basis for the latter. Specific conjunctions of the 1st four concepts, as basis terminology, can create exact definitions for the latter four concepts. In effect, compositions of the intrinsic terminology of comparison can state explicit relations inherent in the nature of the interactive totality -- what can be known and knowable. For example, 'symmetry' can be defined as exactly the notion of 'where there is a sameness of content and a difference of context'.

At 1st, defining symmetry in this specific way seems like a fairly obscure idea, an odd way to think about the notion. However, as you start to analyze it, and look at all the ways that the concept of symmetry is actually and semantically used, both in physics literature, in mathematics, and in the common sense usages of that term, then we can see that there is actually a fundamental correctness to the notion as defined. that everywhere that science uses the notion of symmetry, in basic things, as in the idea of conservation law, or even the notion of lawfulness itself, that the notion of same laws everywhere in the universe, are a same content (an invariant) in multiple contexts. The notion of natural law, as a kind of causal relation, is generalized in the sense of being true, even when there are vast differences in context. Ie that the notion is fully generalized, that physical law is applicable in every time and space, and even in every possibility of what the universe could be, in the explicit sense of the counterfactual, that this notion of absolute lawfulness -- absolute context independence -- holds.

This idea of symmetry as being fundamentally defined in terms of sameness of content and different of context is fundamental to the notion, absolute in definition. Similar notions, definitions, and observations of the completeness of results -- of absolute semantic coherency, in both theory and practice -- can be obtained for the notions of discontinuity, asymmetry, and even of continuity. All four of these terms can be defined purely in terms of sameness difference, content and context. These definitions are consistent with the standard usages of those terms. For more details, I suggest reading the essay dialog on the Incommensuration Theorem, in the metaphysics section of the http:// mflb.com website. The explicit definitions are given there, along with clarifications, some

further ideas, and correspondences to other existing/ known problems in philosophy, mathematics, and physics.

What is important, about all of this, in regards to considering the hard problem of consciousness, is that because of the strictness and exactitude of the dependencies of the four concepts symmetry, continuity, asymmetry, and discontinuity purely in terms of conjunctions of the four concepts of sameness difference, content and context, that there ends up being some explicit 'no-go' theorems that apply in the relation between subjective and objective. Because of the requirement for every sameness, there is a difference, and for every content, there is a context, that you actually have certain pairings of these higher order terms, symmetry, asymmetry, continuity, and discontinuity, that can not be conjunct. Not for any subjective, nor for any objective, in totality, absolutely and positively, due to the very nature inherent in being itself, as a fundamental epistemic and ontological process, both. This is one of the most fundamental results of the metaphysics.

In the same sort of way that we can not have symmetry and asymmetry applying at the same time, or both apply the notions of continuity and discontinuity to the same thing, by the same person, in the same way, at the same time, as a kind of limitation on the nature of possibility itself, it is also the case that other things are similarly forbidden, just on the basis of the logic. It's not just because those two concepts are applying opposite things. It's essentially because certain specific conjunctions would inherently imply that there would be an imbalance in the relationship between sameness and difference. It turns out that there's only two allowed combinations, pairings of these higher concepts: symmetry, continuity, asymmetry, and discontinuity.

You can have symmetry and discontinuity as a combination, OR, you can have asymmetry and continuity as a combination, but never can you have symmetry and continuity at the same time, and moreover, you can never have absolute discontinuity and asymmetry at the same time. Although this is not the occasion to re- prove the Incommensuration Theorem here, it is to be understood that these implications are of a really primal limit, insofar as they apply directly to the notion of comparison itself, as

the primary basis of **any** epistemic process, including that of the scientific method, and that of 1st person consciousness, and thus through these, to the absolute nature of both the subjective and objective, fundamentally.

Yet despite this sort of foundational 'meta-generality', the overall effect turns out to not be as surprising as expected. This same result had already been obtained both in mathematics and in physics separately. The limit stated here is actually the same one that shows up in the Goedel Theorem in mathematics and the Bell Theorem in physics. Less well known is that it also is the basis of the inherent disjunction that occurs between the theories of quantum mechanics and general relativity. Ie, that the notion of 'quantum gravity', or of a 'grand unified theory' is an impossible and inconsistent concept in itself -- and that the all of the possible notions of 'string theory' will be and become just so many other epicycles in western history.

In the same way that reconciling consistency and completeness of mathematics is impossible because of the Goedel Theorem results, and in the same way that we can say, reading the Bell Theorem as an actual empirical experimental result -- that you cannot have a theory of physics that is both lawful and only local -- only assuming causation -- at the same time, we can assert that the direct transition from 3rd person as an absolute model basis of 1st person is an strict, conceptual impossibility. We should not, therefore, expect a general reification of the relationship between quantum mechanics and general relativity, and not having observed one, despite the very smartest among us the world over having been trying for some 50 years. It all turns out to be for the same reason -- because you can't essentially conjoin the notions of symmetry and continuity underneath the Incommensuration Theorem -- because of the very nature of the balances of the concepts themselves as explicitly implied.

The physical universe, and all knowledge of the objective, the physical, mathematical, etc, as recorded and represented in all forms of 3rd person modeling, in computer science, etc, will inherently be based -- cannot not be based, in terms which are symmetric and discontinuous -- analytic process in terms of individual bits, quantized particle states, discrete symbols,

modular components, atoms -- all of which are interchangeable; none of which have specific selective identity as 'personal'. The totality of the subjective, and all knowledge of the subjective, of consciousness, of all 1st person perspectives, experience, personal narrative, culture, song, dance and identity, and of many other topics which have, of late, become so unfashionable to consider, will inherently be based -- cannot not be based, in terms which are asymmetric continuities -- a collective synthesis of communities of mind in time, place, and possibility.

Once understanding the Incommensuration Theorem as a kind of impossibility theorem about the relationship between symmetry and continuity, then it becomes easier -- possible -- to truly understand the nature of the hard problem: It is 'hard' because it is attempting to combine concepts in a way, via a transition, which is inherently impossible. There is a connection between those two modes of being, the symmetric and discontinuous, as one mode, and the asymmetric and continuous, unitary consciousness, but it is not via that 'direction', in the hyperspace of all possible conceptual connections and transitions. The basis for why trying to derive a 1st person perspective directly from a 3rd person perspective is one of a fundamental impossibility, inherent in the nature of knowing, of epistemic process itself, and therefore of being also. It has to do with the nature of the concepts themselves.

And so that is how we address the hard problem of consciousness and why it has the nature that it does. For details, please take a look at the mflb.com website.

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